C

26 March 1963

ADDITIONAL NOTE IN MY MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT:

The President and I engaged in a brief discussion of the Soviet plans with respect to Cuba. He indicated that he once felt that the Soviets would withdraw all of their forces from Cuba, but that he had now reached the conclusion that the plan had changed. Bundy volunteered that they at no time had said specifically that they were to withdraw all of their forces, in fact their particular wording was somewhat vague. McCone stated that indicators were conflicting. On the one hand, certain information such as the recent Brazilian intercept and report of Castro's own statements would lead one to the conclusion that a gradual and continuing withdrawal would take place; that the Cubans were trained and became proficient in operating advanced sophisticated Soviet equipment. This would take many months, probably the balance of the year and Castro welcomed this period of time because it would mean a continuing Soviet interest in Cuba. On the other hand, DCI pointed out that building of permanent installations and the arrival of undisclosed but apparently sophisticated equipment, although in small quantities, nevertheless important volume would indicate a conclusion that Soviets were there to stay, but perhaps on a somewhat reduced scale.

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SECRET

The President then suggested a meeting be held this afternoon to determine a number of matters.

1. We should establish what our contacts are with the groups so that we can guide them effectively, whether we can stand down the operations.

2. A policy statement which State is undertaking.

3. The question of prosecution which the AG would undertake.

4. Discussing with UK since there is evidence that much of this originated in the Bahamas.

5. The question of any informal discussion with the Soviet Union.

At the meeting attended by AG, McNamara, McCone, Cottrell, Douglas Dillon, it was decided to send a group to Miami this afternoon for discussion with the Miami representatives of the FBI and CIA, Immigratio ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ officials, Coast Guard, etc. Principal purposes would be to:

1. Find out all we know about the groups, who they are, where they are, and what can be done about them.

2. Lateral transfer of information between CIA and FBI Miami. Apparently there is not sufficient exchange between CIA and FBI in Miami.

3. Ways and means of using Customs and Coast Guard for some of this.

4. Warning the unauthorized groups in advance of actions we intend to take against them. Also warning the suppliers of explosives, arms, etc.

5. FCC shut down illicit radio stations, provide a truck equipped with DF-equipment to locate the stations.

6. Explore what could be done to influence the groups away from Soviet targets. In this connection, the AG favored a complete standdown before any attempt was made to guide the groups.

7. Alexis Johnson expressed greatest concern over the plane matter and asked that the group take immediate action to immobilize the plane.

SECRET

Excerpt from President's Press Conference -- April 3

THE PRESIDENT: As you know, our best information is that they did not come from the United States. We have already indicated that we do not feel that these kind of raids serve a useful purpose. It seems to me in some ways they strengthen the Russian position in Cuba and the Communist control of Cuba and justify repressive measures within Cuba which might otherwise not be regarded as essential. So that we have not supported this and these men do not have a connection with the United States Government. I think a raid which goes in and out does indicate the frustrations of Cuban exiles who want to get back home and who want to strike some blow, but I don't think that it increases the chances of freeing Cuba.

John A. McCone

CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

March 28, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL MEMBERS OF THE NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

Draft letter to the President from the Secretary regarding the problem presented by Cuban refugee groups

The President has called an NSC Executive Committee Meeting for Friday, March 29 at 12:30 p.m. to discuss the problem posed by Cuban refugee groups.

The Secretary has asked me to make available to you the attached proposed letter from him to the President which will serve as a basis for discussion at tomorrow's meeting. The letter has not yet been signed by the Secretary but presumably will go to the President in its present form. If any substantive changes are made at the time of signature I shall so inform you.

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

CONFIDENTIAL Attachment

CONFIDENTIAL

Group I
Excluded from
automatic down-
grading and de-
classification

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Washington

DRAFT LETTER
TO BE USED AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AT THE NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING FRIDAY, MARCH 29 at 12:30 p.m.

Dear Mr. President:

I am concerned that hit and run raids by Cuban exiles may create incidents which work to the disadvantage of our national interest. Increased frequency of these forays could raise a host of problems over which we would not have control.

Actions such as yesterday's exile attack which caused substantial damage to a Soviet vessel may complicate our relations with the USSR without net advantage to us.

I therefore propose several measures which could impede or deter further attacks of this nature.

First, the intelligence community could increase its efforts in Miami to develop hard information about projected raids. This is currently communicated to Customs authorities charged with investigation of violation of arms control.

Second, Customs and the Coast Guard, on the basis of this information can stop and search the vessels. (They now do this, and picked up about 50 men and four boats last year.) Arms and vessels are confiscated, and participants arraigned if a violation of law has

The President,

The White House.

CONFIDENTIAL

occurred. Bail is set in accordance with the severity of the violation. An increase of one or more vessels to facilitate current customs and Coast Guard operations in the Miami area would be helpful.

Third, CIA, FBI and Customs officials in Miami could quietly inform suspects in the exile community that the United States intends to intensify enforcement of violations of pertinent laws relating to exile raids.

Fourth, the FCC could locate and close down illegal radio transmitters operating out of the Miami area in connection with these raids.

Fifth, we can inform the British Government of our plans to try to control these activities and express our understanding that the British Government has become increasingly concerned about the possibility that British territory in the Bahamas may be used for these raids and may be considering action to police these areas more effectively.

These measures have not been discussed with any of the senior officials of the Departments concerned, but if any of the measures commend themselves to you, I suggest that a meeting of the interested Departments be called to discuss the problem.

Faithfully yours,

Dean Rusk

March 28, 1963

13-00000

29 March 1963

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Cuban Raids

1. Organizations such as the Second Front of Escambrey, Alpha 66, and Lamba 66 are well-known in the Cuban colony in Florida and Puerto Rico. Their plans are discussed openly, are picked up by CIA and reported almost daily in our CIA bulletins.

2. There is no doubt that the individuals are in and out of Florida and Puerto Rico. The boats, outboard motors, guns, ammunition and explosives originate in the United States from legally licensed or unlicensed sources (of which there are many). We believe that the operations are staged out of the Bahamas and other non-U.S. areas.

3. The operations are skillfully executed by men of obvious courage and dedication. Apparently the organizations are building up and we can expect more rather than fewer instances in the future.

4. Obviously raids of this type will exascerbate problems with Castro and more particularly the Soviet Union and, from that standpoint, are undesirable. However, successful harrassment will create very considerable annoyance, will stimulate internal dissension, will complicate Castro's problems and will have very considerable effect in discrediting Castroism in Latin America. Inability of Castro to deal with these raids might cause the Soviets to question the strength of his position and therefore reappraise their own position in Cuba. It is impossible to predict the result of such reappraisal. On the one hand it might cause them to question their presence in Cuba; on the other to reinforce it; and finally, might cause them to open up a discussion of their presence with the United States.

5. Finally, although it is outside of the competence of the Intelligence Community, it is my personal view that a concerted and publicized effort to "stand down" these operations would probably draw more public and press criticism in the United States than would result from tolerating these acts while officially disassociating the government from them through denial of both responsibility and control.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

13-00000

#29

SECRET

29 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Executive Committee Meeting - 12:30 p.m. - 29 March 1963

IN ATTENDANCE: All present, plus Cottrell, Kaysen, Dungan and others

The President raised the question of what should be our policy on hit-and-run raids and asked my views. I reported my views as per the attached memorandum of 29 March. Secretary Rusk stated that the United States would be blamed for unauthorized raids, the Soviets would expect that we could stop them and they would immediately take counter actions such as escorting ships, etc. On a minimum, we should act to disassociate ourselves and do all possible not to permit the continuance of unauthorized raids.

Dillon stated that we could not stop them because of the number of ports, small ships, inadequate coast guard facilities, etc. McNamara countered by saying that we could stop them by utilizing military resources. As a second alternative he suggested we might explore modifying our course of action and finally, should disassociate ourselves from responsibility. The Attorney General outlined various steps that could be taken to identify the leadership of the various groups and to either prosecute them or exclude them from the country through immigration procedures. Thompson and Harriman expressed particular concern over the reported airplane that was ready to bomb Soviet ship. Practically all in attendance thought that we should try and guide the operation away from attacks on Soviet ships because of obvious reaction of the Soviets. The Vice President felt that we would be criticized either from letting them go on the one hand, or stopping them on the other. He felt the military should immediately study that which should be done to stop them and all actions should be taken to halt the unauthorized raids.

SECRET

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TOP SECRET

Noted by DCI

#6

Notes on Remarks by President Kennedy before the National Security Council
Tuesday, January 22, 1963

I will start by reviewing areas of policy which will be before us in the coming months and indicate the general attitude which I have toward them and to emphasize where we might put our emphasis in the next few months.

The responsibilities of the United States are worldwide and the U.S. is the only country which is recognizing its wide responsibilities. We are part of NATO, SEATO, etc. and support other pacts even though we are not a part of them. Other nations are not doing their share.

Would like to say a word first about Cuba.

The indications are that the importance of timing is of paramount importance in reaching judgments -- both by the USSR and the US. Our big problem is to protect our interests and prevent a nuclear war. It was a very close thing whether we would engage in a quarantine or an air strike. In looking back, it was really that it presented us with an immediate crises and the USSR had to make their judgment and come to a decision to act in twelve hours. In looking back over that four or five day period, we all changed our views somewhat, or at least appreciated the advantages and disadvantages of alternate cources of action. That is what we should do in any other struggle with the Soviet Union -- and I believe we will be in one in the future. We should have sufficient time to consider the alternatives. You could see that the Russians had a good deal of debate in a 48 hour period. If they had only to act in an hour or two, their actions would have been spasmodic and might have resulted in nuclear war. It is important that we have time to study their reaction. We should continue our policy even though we do not get Europe to go along with us.

The time will probably come when we will have to act again on Cuba. Cuba might be our response in some future situation -- the same way the Russians have used Berlin. We may decide that Cuba might be a more satisfactory response than a nuclear response. We must be ready -- although this might not come. We should be prepared to move on Cuba if it should be in our national interest. The planning by the US, by the Military, in the direction of our effort should be advanced always keeping Cuba in mind in the coming months and to be ready to move with all possible speed. We can use Cuba to limit their actions just as they have had Berlin to limit our actions.

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In thematter of Europe, [the US has been faced since 1958 with deGaulle's position. . . . . nuclear veto by French .... President Eisenhower reviewed the problem and took the position that it should be reviewed by the NATO nations -- the NATO nations would not act. ... no agreement between the Three. That decision this Administration also supported. However, this decision has not produced the present contention with the French. Even when I was in Paris last June, de Gaulle said he would make some proposal in regard to NATO itself. All through his speeches and his memoirs he indicates it is his desire to have a Europe in which France would be a dominant power speaking to the USSR and to the Western World as an equal. If we had given him atomic weapons he would be difficult to deal with.]

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De Gaulle [did not question our support of Western Europe because we have maintained strong representation there, but the French have not. They have not been aggressive as we have been and, therefore it is not a distrust of us that we will desert Europe but it is that he feels that France should assert a position as a strong France and cease its growing reliance on the U.S.]

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TOP SECRET

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Having made such proposals to the US and Great Britain and been turned down, he has made the same turn to Germany. This is not so bad as it has prevented Germany moving to the East. And, historically, Germany's trade has been to the East. There is not much harm to us in this position. With Great Britain joining the Common Market, this would strengthen Europe but France will not let them in at this time. If G.B. does go in, it will cost us a good deal in trade, but it will be good for the stability of Europe. France keeping Britain out is a setback for us, but a more severe setback for G.B. They are going to have a difficult time in Europe. It is our interest to strengthen Europe and the unilateral concept, and deGaulle is opposed to this. By strengthening the multilateral concept, it strengthens NATO and increases their dependence on us. This strengthens our invluence in Europe and gives us the power to guide Europe and keep it strong. The events of the past two weeks makes it important for us to support the multilateral concept and that is why deGaulle is more opposed to it. It will be difficult to work this out, but it is important that we do so. But we should not be wholly distressed. 98

98 After all we have done for France in so many ways, deGaulle has opposed us in many places throughout the world - in NATO, in the Congo and other places -- but he is there and we have to live with it. One way we can dO so is to strengthen the mutilateral force and NATO.

Our negotiators on trade matters will have to be very careful to protect our interests. Our trade balance is of great concern and is not under control. If we get down to the $12 billion coverage of our national reserve we will 98 be in trouble. We will have pressure on the dollar and pressure from the Congress and they will begin to follow a much narrower policy. We will

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We will be very tough about the actions that Europe takes. We maintain large forces in West Germany. If West Germany does not maintain sufficient forces but instead concentrats on agricultural production for instance to our detriment, we must take a strong position. At present we are paying half of Norway's air and sea power for instance and supporting NATO, and they are "living off the fat of the land" while we are paying for their protection. In the coming months we must concentrate on howwe can protect the interests of the United States. We have pursued a very generous policy. We have lost our economic power over these countries. Now we are running out and if the French and others get atomic capacity they will be independent and we will be on the outside looking in. Do not think that the Europeans will do anything for us even though we have done a lot for them. So we must have all our representatives looking out very strongly for the U.S. interests. We must be sure our economic house is in order and use our military, policital power to protect our own interests.

Regarding our attitude toward the neutrals. There is criticism about our lack of difference between the Allies and the neutrals. the Pakistanis are critical, but we must recognize the importance of the Indians. If they joined the Chinese we would have no free south Asia. The Pakistannis are struggling against the Indians and the Afganistans. They will use or attempt to exploit our power. Our interest is to make a strong sub-continent. We will use the country that can help further that aim. We have used India lately. We do not like their present leadership, but we can use them. While doing this we have moved away from the Pakistannis and they are moving closer to the Chinese and against the Indians. We have not been able to persuade 98

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the Pakistannis or the Afganistans to chance thir policy on India. These forces were there long before we came on the scene and we cannot do much about it — we cannot settle all the disputes, but we want to keep them free from the Communists. We cannot permit those who call themselves neutrals to be completely taken into the Communist camp. We must keep our ties with Nassir and others, even though we do not like the leaders themselves.

With regard to AID which is going forward under General Clay, we hope we can tie this whole concept of aid to the safety of the United States. This is the reason we give aid. The test is whether it will serve the United States and if we can equate it to that. AID is not a good word. Perhaps we can describe it better as Mutual Assistance — though this is an old term. Some countries can go it alone, but we must do all we can. We must make every effort to keep a country out of the communist bloc. It is more difficult to get a country out of a communist bloc once it is in. It sometimes seems hopeless. The Congress may cut the heart out of Foreign Aid and this is a great danger to the safety of the United States. Even the French give more aid than we do on a per capita basis. We will probably take a cut, but we do not want to hurt our Defense effort. We would not like four or five countries to suddenly turn communist just because we did not give a certain amount of aid. We must look this over very carefully and put aid on the basis it will best serve our own interest.

Turning to the domestic scene, we will have a deficit of about $12 of $12½ billion. We have made an effort to hold the deficit down and we have in the past three years. Except for Defense and Space and Interest on the Debt we have increased the National Budget but it has been increased less than it was under the previous Administration. With the tremendous movement from the country to the cities, we have had many problems. While the costs have increased, the receipts have dropped. We have only increased about 1% a year in the growth rate during the past ten years. This is serious, particularly with the great increase in population.

I think this Tax Bill is very important. If we get another recession in this country it will have a bad effect on the gold reserve. It will have a bad psycological effect on the people of the U.S. And when we see the strong position that Mr. Khruschev is taking with regard to agricultural and other domestic sections of the economy -- and if we just drift, we will look very bad to other nations.

Furthermore, the deficit is a reflection of the fight in the hot and cold war we have been fighting during the past fifteen years. If we go to a deficit of $12 billion, this would be a most serious affair for the United States. If we can go forward with the present Tax Bill, we will be in much better shape. All of these matters -- the tax program, AID, defense, etc. are all related.

The Military are disturbed because of our failure to go forward with certain programs. For instance: The B-70, Nike-Zeus, Skybolt. As a matter of fact, we are going forward with a large program and there is a limit to how much we can do, and if the necessity develops we will do more

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This Administration has spent a good many millions more than has been appropriated for S~ace and Defense — and perhaps we should spend more.

98 One of our big jobs will be to persuade our colleagues in Europe to to do a better job themselves. If we maintain six divisions in Europe and they only maintain a force which will permit them to fight only two 98 or three days — if we have sufficient force to fight and supply for ninety days and those around us can ohly fight for two or three days, then we should take another look. France carries their burden abroad, but not in Europe. We should consider very hard the narrow interests of the United States as well as the interests of the Free World. If we grown weak economically, our influence will grown less and less and if that happens, our Free World's position will grown weaker. De Gaulle is basing his whole position on the position of the United States. He can do this because he feels we will maintain our military power in Europe and he can bank on it.

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Mr. Foster is engaged in the Test Ban. We might be successful here if the Russians need it and if they know that we will change this if the Chicoms develop an atomic capacity. If they do we will have great difficulty in protecting Asia. If the Test Ban Treaty is successful it will inhibit the Russians from starting a nuclear war and if so we should make every effort to conclude the treaty. But if the nuclear test ban includes only the Russians and the U.S. it is not worth very much. We should support Foster all we can until we see where it is going. If we get a successful treaty, we will fight it through if it will help us. (On the Hill ?)

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Thanks for your cooperation. All worked well together and harmoniously. Hope we can maintain the mutual relations which have been so good in this Administration.

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File WE

23 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting on the Multi-lateral Forces - 5:30 p.m., 22 March, 1963

ATTENDANCE: The President, Secretaries McNamara, Gilpatric, Rusk, Ball, General Taylor, Ambassador Merchant, Mr. McCone, Mr. Kaysen and several others

The purpose of the meeting was to receive Ambassador Merchant's report on his visits to the Capitals. Merchant reported qualified success, indicating reservations by the German, Italians and British for various reasons, the two most prominent ones being:

a. Problem of control;
b. Use of surface ships versus submarines.

A long discussion ensued in which it was evident that there was no clear-cut decision on the part of those in attendance as to the extent of the control of the United States versus control by European countries since it seemed to mean that control should shape up so that missiles could not be fired without United States clearance; on the other hand the United States should not be able to unilaterally decide to fire the missiles. However, no country or group of countries exclusive of the United States should be likewise able to fire them.

There was a difference of opinion between State and Merchant on the one hand, and of the President on the other, as to whether Merchant's discussions should be reviewed with the Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, and Joint Committees at this time. The President was insistent that no approach be made to Congress at this time. Merchant dissented from this viewpoint but agreed to the President's directive.

It was felt that the final expression of viewpoints should be sought from the Germans and the Italians, and it was agreed to draft a letter to Adenauer seeking an expression from him, with a similar letter to the Italians, though it was thought that no opinion should be sought from the Italians because of the impending election.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

With respect to submarine versus surface ships, McNamara restated the opinion that surface ships were better and were quite invulnerable because they would operate in coastal waters where several thousand ships of all types would be operating and therefore the missile ships could not be readily identified and attacked.

The President seemed to feel that the multi-lateral forces idea was not going to go any place; as he wound up, he seemed to be thinking more of how the idea could be put to bed without its failure being used against the United States or his administration to the advantage of de Gaulle and others who held stricly to the "European control" idea.

No action was required on our part. I expressed no viewpoint at this meeting.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director

JAM/mfb